were even treated in hospital. There are similar examples in contemporary western medicine, quite as extraordinary as the theory of John Brown, an eighteenth century Edinburgh physician, who thought that all ills were either excitements or depressions, to be treated respectively with opium or with alcohol. His own problem was depression and he died of the cure. 'The matter, however, was not a joke. In Gottingen, for instance, this "Brunonian" doctrine was still causing students' riots at the end of the century' (Pledge 1939) .
Social factors playa large part in determining what is regarded as healthy or unhealthy and hence what kinds of problems are brought to doctors. The basic question for clinicians is how to determine the balance of advantage and disadvantage expected from making and acting upon a disease theory compared with applying other types of theory or doing nothing at all. It is unrealistic to expect that social factors will not also affect this decision process, particularly when the problem is described mainly in psychological or in social terms.
Recognizing syndromes
In order to lessen the risk of misunderstanding, I shall use the term 'disease' to denote a cluster (or syndrome) of traits (or symptoms) which can reliably be differentiated by trained examiners and which are, or are likely to be, explicable in terms of one or more theory of how some underlying biological process goes out of balance. The most fully developed disease concept is based on an interlocking set of well-tested theories concerning aetiology, pathology, treatment and course. This formulation avoids the somewhat sterile argument as to whether categorical or dimensional theories are more useful. Both types are always necessary in the long run.
Disease syndromes are often recognized, in the first place, through a process of creative appreciation. This was the case, for example, with 'early childhood autism'. In 1799, soon after the French Revolution, Jean Marc Gaspard Itard wrote a treatise describing the characteristics and treatment of a boy discovered living wild in the woods of Aveyron in southern France who would now be diagnosed as having a form of early childhood autism. Itard was a forerunner of Seguin and Montessori and he anticipated in this treatise practically all the advances that have been made in recent times. He had an enormous impact on the way that diagnosis, treatment and services for the deaf (particularly deaf-mutes) and the mentally retarded developed. His description of the wild boy's disabilities is easily recognizable today. But the original diagnosis, made by the famous physician Pinel, was that Victor (as the boy was named) was an idiot. Hard disagreed. Influenced by the ideas of John Locke, he thought the boy was normal but uneducated-his mind a tabula rasa upon which an assiduous teacher could inscribe what he pleased (Lane 1977) . The ingenious methods of education that he devised and the experiments by which he tested their efficacy provide a model which clinical psychologists today have hardly equalled. They are written in the matchless prose of the time and are worth studying in detail. Hard did indeed achieve considerable success but he was not able to realize his real ambition, which was to teach Victor to talk. After several years of effort he gave up the attempt. My own view is that he came to accept that Pinel had been right.
Consequently, Itard never recognized that both Pinel's early diagnosis, and his own diagnosis that Victor was a normal boy abandoned by his parents, were wrong; that he was dealing with a syndrome distinct from either, and that the variants of autism were likely some day to be shown to have some common pathological feature. It was not until Leo Kanner (1942) not only described but namedthe syndrome that further advances could be made. This act of creative clinical recognition and labelling has been the basis for all subsequent progress including the recovery of Itard's insights and the more recent understanding of the relationships between early childhood autism and mental retardation (Wing & Gould 1979) .
Testing a disease theory Once a clinical syndrome has been recognized and labelled the next step can be taken, which is to construct and test the validity of various explanatory theories. Schizophrenia provides a useful illustration (Wing 1978a) . Two large-scale international studies, in which standardized techniques were used to describe and classify (with good reliability) the symptoms by patients admitted to psychiatric clinics in many parts of the world, have thrown light on the way that psychiatrists make this diagnosis. One of these studies is the USA-UK Diagnostic Project carried out in New York and London (Cooper et al. 1972) . The other is the International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia carried out in centres in Aarhus, Agra, Cali, Ibadan, London, Moscow, Prague, Taipei and Washington (WHO 1973) .
By using a standard technique of clinical examination and symptom recording (Wing et al. 1974) it was discovered that two-thirds of all patients given a clinical diagnosis of schizophrenic or paranoid psychosis had experienced symptoms belonging to a central syndrome, including, but not confined to, Kurt Schneider's 'symptoms of the first rank' (Schneider 1959) . Very specific definitions are required in order to differentiate such symptoms from experiences that are described in somewhat similar terms but are in fact of cultural or subcultural origin and from experiences common in other functional psychoses such as mania or depression.
In both international studies, it was found that other syndromes were labelled 'schizophrenic', even when the central syndrome was absent. There were many paranoid syndromes, catatonic syndromes, and less easily defined or recognized behavioural or affective abnormalities. A much broader concept of 'schizophrenia' was used in centres in the USA and USSR than elsewhere in the world. Whether or not it will be demonstrated that these other syndromes are indeed related to the central syndrome will depend upon evidence of a different kind.
Let us consider, therefore, the basis for a disease theory of the central symdrome. One piece of evidence that such a theory will eventually be considered derives from the observation that the central schizophrenic syndrome can be precipitated by a variety of toxic agents such as alcohol, amphetamine and bromide, and that it can occur as part of the aura to a temporal lobe fit or as part of the symptomatology accompanying various kinds of cerebral pathology. The therapeutic response to phenothiazine medication points in the same direction. Most evidence, however, is indirect. There are pointers from epidemiology, biochemistry, neurophysiology and genetics but these do not suggest any direct link between the central syndrome and a specifiable abnormality.
To claim confidently that 'schizophrenia is a disease' is to invite dissension from those who will only agree if they can see the pathology and understand how it is related to the symptoms. To suggest that there is evidence that a disease theory (or set of theories) will eventually be worked out in detail is to stand on much firmer ground. But even in the case of syndromes where the value of disease theories is indisputable (e.g. diabetes mellitus) there is no doubt that social and psychological factors also play an important part. Doctors must be aware, therefore, of the kinds of social and psychological environment in which onset or relapse are most common and in which chronic impairments are likely to arise and be maintained.
An excess of social stimulation (brought about, for example, by too high social expectations or by distressing 'life events') can precipitate an acute relapse with central schizophrenic symptoms. There is also an opposite effect of too little social stimulation, which produces an increase in chronic impairments such as slowness, underactivity, flatness of affect, poverty of speech and lack of motivation. The patient with schizophrenia has to walk a tightrope between these opposite kinds of danger. Health education, in the sense of increasing awareness of the strategies available to cope with disabilities and with the risk of relapse, is just as important for patients and relatives as it is in the case of a physical impairment such as blindness or diabetes or parkinsonism.
Social disadvantage and adverse personal reaction
Two other kinds of problems are usually present in some degree whenever a disease syndrome is present. Discussing these provides an opportunity to consider the sociological theories put forward by Scheff (1964) and Goffman (1961) which purport to explain 'schizophrenia' without recourse to disease theories.
The first problem is social disadvantage. For example, people who are admitted to hospital differ statistically from the general population on several common demographic factors. A very wide range of conditions, from hernia to carcinoma, show higher age-adjusted admission rates in the single than in the ever-married, and in the divorced or widowed compared with those who are still married at the time of admission. A similar association can be observed in schizophrenia. In the days when patients used to stay longer in hospital than they do now, it was chiefly those who were not living in a family setting who used to remain for a long time. Even now, we find that those who remain for a long time in sheltered residential settings such as hospitals, hostels and group homes, tend to be socially isolated people, out of touch with their families, with few social or vocational skills. A long history of social disadvantage before the frank onset of disease is likely to affect the course after onset and efforts have to be made, so far as possible, to correct such social deficits and to capitalize on any undeveloped talents. This is quite as important as medication in helping to determine the social course.
The second type of problem is more subtle. It concerns the way patients react to their acute symptoms and chronic impairments and to any social disadvantages to which they have been exposed. This secondary reaction in turn depends to a considerable extent on the way important people in the social environment react-including family members, workmates, employers, professional people and the public in general. Edwin Lemert (I 951) put forward a theory of primary and secondary social deviance in which he explained how people with physical handicaps such as blindness (in sociological terms this would be 'primary deviance') learned to adjust to the expectations of society. When they had learned how to live with blindness in that particular social environment, he called the adjustment 'secondary deviance'. This is a useful formulation to apply to a condition like schizophrenia. If the social environment is not helpful the sufferer will tend to develop an adverse reaction, with lowered self-esteem and self-confidence, which has the effect (in Merton's terminology) of amplifying deviance. (I prefer the term 'disability amplification'.) Scheff and Goffman have formulated a more radical version of Lemert's theory, in which the primary focus or disease syndrome is denied. 'Schizophrenia' is regarded solely as a form of secondary deviance. Scheff put forward some empirical evidence in favour of the theory, based on the process of admission to mental hospitals in Wisconsin at a time when all patients had to be admitted compulsorily. In a subsequent study of a county hospital in Wisconsin, I found several patients labelled as 'schizophrenic' who seemed never to have had any of the symptoms that most European psychiatrists would regard as necessary for the diagnosis. All were in hospital under compulsion, none was allowed into the local town alone, and only 5% of the women could go into the hospital grounds unescorted (Wing & Brown 1970) .
The laws and the conditions have since been radically changed but, in those days, once a patient had been admitted to hospital with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, the chance of discharge was low and sank lower with every extra year of residence. Goffman pointed out that the restrictions necessary to control a few potentially dangerous or disturbing patients tended to be generalized to the amenable majority. After a few years of such a regime, patients became 'institutionalized' and no longer wished to leave, even if their intrinsic impairements were not severe.
Thus it could be argued that some patients were admitted to hospital, given a diagnosis of 'schizophrenia' although no typical symptoms were present, and kept incarcerated until 'institutionalism' developed, this being taken as confirmation of the diagnosis. Social disablement would thus have been created by the application of a diagnostic label. This radical formulation of Lemert's theory did not attempt to deal with most of the evidence relating to schizophrenia, even at the time, and it could hardly be held to apply in modern circumstances, in which the emphasis is placed on preventing admission or a prolonged stay; but its plausibility in certain limited circumstances gave a degree of credibility to anti medical theories which are still in the air today. The broader, less specific and less reliable the criteria used to diagnose 'schizophrenia', the more likely it is that psychiatrists will be influenced by social, and even political, pressures and ideologies, and will expose themselves to legitimate criticism (Wing 1978b) .
That this is not a new problem is chillingly illustrated by the Sophronisterion, or house of sanity, suggested by Plato, in which religious dissenters were to receive five years of corrective instruction in order to restore them to a sound mind (Simon 1978) .
Living with schizophrenia The moderate form of Lemert's theory is still, however, very helpful and forms the unacknowledged basis of much that is valuable in social medicine and social psychiatry. At least three types of theory are relevant to the maintenance and prevention of social disablement: one concerned with the precipitation and maintenance of acute schizophrenic symptoms and chronic impairments, one concerned with social disadvantages, and one concerned with the development of adverse personal reactions. We are only now beginning to recognize that the trial-and-error efforts of patients and relatives constitute a store of knowledge from which professionals can learn, so that they in turn can pass on the best of this experience in order to help sufferer and family to live with schizophrenia (Wing 1978a) . Psychiatry has to take this task seriously during the next decade.
Advantages and disadvantages of disease concepts This analysis of the value of disease theories of the central schizophrenic syndrome, when used together with social and psychological theories of social disadvantage and adverse personal reaction, can be applied to many other well-defined psychiatric syndromes (Wing 1978b) . There are, of course, many ill-defined disorders with less clear-cut boundaries, which merge into conditions that are so common that to call them 'disease syndromes' introduces the problem faced by Rene Dubos' tribe. In due course, specific syndromes might be recognized and disease theories prove useful. Meanwhile, medical terminology needs to be used with circumspection and with an awareness of the fact that it raises expectations in physicians and in prospective patients that may not be justified.
Doctors, in their role as healers, wish to help all their patients, not only those whose .presenting problems can relatively simply be resolved by making a diagnosis and prescribing an appropriate treatment. But when acting in a wider role they need to be aware that ideologies of various kinds (particularly those which include a vision of what constitutes 'health') may have implications that go far beyond ordinary professional practice. In particular, it is necessary to emphasize that most 'social deviance' is not explicable in terms of disease theories and that a diagnosis, even of a serious condition such as schizophrenia, does not necessarily mean that the individual is socially deviant. We must use our terms more precisely and learn not to claim or to expect too much.
Critics of medicine suggest that all doctors, but particularly psychiatrists, get into the habit of making diagnoses when no disease theory is usefully applicable, and there is certainly a medical expansionism which capitalizes on the patient's willingness to feel better simply because a label has been applied and something has been done. On the other hand, psychological and social theories of causation and treatment are also applied in an uncritical way, without any real intention of testing them. Any human complaint can be accommodated within certain theories; contradictions are as welcome as consistency. Much of the criticism of psychiatry so evident during the past decade has been a reaction to a medical tendency, accurately recognized but over-generalized by the critics, to go too far. We should resist the opportunity presented by the beams in our neighbours' eyes to deny the motes in our own. I commend the statement of a distinguished medical sociologist concerning these borderline problems: 'What is required is more careful research and not more casual theories that purport to explain everything and in fact explain nothing.... What we need now are better data and not more debate' (Mechanic 1978) .
